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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation used the art market, an industry characterized by a high level of
product heterogeneity, as a testing ground to investigate how intermediaries exploit
information asymmetries to extract profits and generate a persistent competitive
advantage. Furthermore, it provided insights into the extent to which uncertainty
with respect to the quality of artworks limits the mobility of historically underrepre-
sented market participants who are subject to larger information asymmetries due
to their group belonging based on their gender. Focusing on the interaction between
information asymmetries, prices and the behavior of agents, the thesis contributes
to a deeper understanding of the sources and impact of informational advantage
in markets that are subject to uncertainty about the quality of a good, the value of
experts and the extent of inequality for underrepresented groups in these industries.
To briefly summarize, chapter 2 focused on expertise as a source of informational
advantage. It studied the evolution of the art dealer profession over a time period
of over a century, during the emergence of the modern art market in 19th century
in London. It was shown that entry into the market coincided primarily with the
intensity of the current trading activity of dealers and was deterred by increased
competition. Furthermore, access to buyer and seller identities made it possible to
observe the individual acquisition strategies that were used at auction to replenish
dealer inventories. It was shown that dealers who accumulated a larger amount of
expertise paid higher prices at auction controlling for artwork characteristics. The
fact that these dealers could sustain a longer market presence lends support to the
conjecture their expertise helped them form more precise signals on the value of the
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artworks. It appears that the size of the premium paid at auction can be regarded
as a proxy for the value they created as experts by lowering information costs for
their clients. Chapter 3 focused on the informational advantage that arises from a
network and took a closer look at the position of art dealers within the nexus of
other buyers and sellers. Using Bayesian methods and network measures, it was
found that an art dealer’s likelihood to link to a seller increased with the size and
depth of his network as well as with a higher degree of homophily between the
agents. In addition, it was shown that a larger and deeper network exacerbated
informational asymmetries across buyers, leading to higher profits due to lower
prices, and facilitated longer market presence.
Overall, these two studies shed some light on how intermediaries who are active
in a market characterized by uncertainty are able to exploit their informational ad-
vantage to extract larger profits. A limitation of these studies is the absence of a
perfect proxy for artwork quality. While a large number of artwork and transaction
characteristics commonly used in the art economics literature which explain a large
amount of variation in prices was controlled for, the possibility that unobserved
quality attributes lead to differences in the prices paid by different dealers cannot
be excluded. One way to control for quality would be to use auction house pre-sale
estimates that are commonly printed in auction catalogues prior to sales, but these
were only institutionalized in the 1970s. Furthermore, data on the resale prices paid
in the private dealer market is not available. As a result, the size of the profits deal-
ers were able to extract from their auction acquisitions could not be quantified. To
further advance art market research it would be crucial to gain more insights into
the private businesses of art dealers which account for about 63% of sales within
the art market (Pownall, 2017). However, this would require art market interme-
diaries to shift away from current practices that shield sales data from the public
towards more transparency. Another interesting avenue for future research would
be to investigate whether the influence of experts decreases with a larger amount
of public information and more possibilities for cost-efficient self-representation for
artists that came about with the emergence of social media.
Chapter 4, shifted the focus from art market intermediaries to the producers of art
and tested whether the belonging to an underrepresented group can constitute a
disadvantage when information asymmetries are present. In particular, the chapter
analyzed whether there is a difference between the performance of female and male
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artists in terms of prices achieved at auction. For this analysis, the entire population
of fine art auction transactions for Western artists for the period between 2000 and
2017 was employed. It was documented that female artists were highly underrep-
resented at auction with a share of less than 5% in terms of sales value and volume
with an increasing trend for younger generations of female artists. However, it was
still found that art dealers tended to represent a higher proportion of male artists
compared to female artists, despite an equal distribution of men and women gradu-
ating with fine arts degrees. Furthermore, it was shown that conditional on gallery
representation, female artists were less likely to progress onto the auction market,
which represents the secondary market, and is a sign of market recognition. The
study provided evidence of an average price premium for artworks by deceased fe-
male artists and a price discount on artworks by contemporary female artists, sug-
gesting that uncertainty about artwork quality might be driving the results. Lastly,
it was shown that there was no single female artist traded at the superstar league of
the market where 40% of revenues are still concentrated.
These results provided a snapshot of the current state of the art market with respect
to gender equality, and can be used as an important input by regulators and art
market institutions to design initiatives that help restore gender balance in the in-
dustry. One limitation of the study is that demand and supply explanations for the
observed differences in performance for female and male artists cannot be disentan-
gled. While the imbalance in artist representation in the primary market suggested
that intermediaries might be partially responsible for female artists’ lack of expo-
sure to collectors and discriminate against women at the hiring stage, the discount
for contemporary female lots at auction pointed to a demand side explanation. It
is therefore important for future research to disentangle these two narratives. It
is crucial to detect the leak in the pipeline where the attrition of women from the
profession occurs and whether there is indeed a systematic bias among intermedi-
aries or collectors. Moreover, analyzing purchasing patterns of different buyer types
(whose identities remain undisclosed in both the private market and at auction) is
also valuable for gaining insights on whether preferences are driving the difference
in performance.
To conclude, the main findings of this thesis stress the importance of experts in set-
tings of high uncertainty. Building up expertise yields considerable power and en-
ables intermediaries to have more accurate price estimates and a higher chance of
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survival in the market. Furthermore, a large and deep network with other mar-
ket participants facilitates preferential access to information, improving conditions
of exchange in the form of lower prices and a sustained market presence. Mar-
ket structures that emerge from such dynamics result in a small number of very
powerful intermediaries and persist over long periods of time. Additionally, with
respect to the mobility of underrepresented groups, the thesis showed important di-
vergences between the dominant group and the minority group. This suggests that
industries characterized by large information asymmetries and high competition for
ranks and profits, disadvantage groups who have historically been excluded from
the market and for whom information is more costly to acquire.
“Die Wahrheit ist eben kein Kristall, den man in die Tasche stecken kann, sondern eine
unendliche Flüssigkeit, in die man hineinfällt.”
Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities
